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Vinciane Despret’s short 2009 book Thinking
Like a Rat is a continuation of her concept of
asking good questions in animal research and
use of the tools of biosemiotics and cognitive
ethology to address how animals perceive,
interpret, and act upon research situations.
She asks, prominently, what does the maze
mean for the rat? In doing so she points out
that behaviorist research using rats and
mazes failed to inquire how the rats perceived
the mazes and what the rats found interesting.
It also overlooked the ways in which the maze
itself was fashioned as a tool that intersected
heavily with the everyday habits and naviga-
tion of rats living within the walls of a
human built environment. Departing from
that research and drawing on the critiques of
the experimenter effect and the perception of
expectation in research, she opens up the ﬁeld
of research involving animals and humans to
include more understanding of how animals
perceive contexts of research and form intersub-
jective ties with human scientists as well as
other animals that affect the outcome of the
research. She points out that animals, like
human research subjects, are canny observers
of the process who often have a good idea of
what the research is designed to reveal, regard-
less of the lures, dissimulation, and other tools
used to mask the true questions at hand. She
proposes developing interesting questions that
give animals a chance to demonstrate their
interests and be interesting in lieu of reductive
and standardizing set-ups that seek to hide the
true questions at hand or treat all individuals
as the same. Interesting research asks
animals about their interests and ways of
doing things rather than attempting to force
an answer to a question that may or may not
be of importance to them. The book is divided
into six chapters and an interview discussion.
The ﬁrst chapter is devoted to “Lures and Arte-
facts” as important concepts and practices in
research with animals. The second chapter
asks what happens “if researchers are nice
with their animals,” opening up the consider-
ations about how good questions and genuine
interest in the life and mind of an animal
can produce much more fascinating results
than stultifying repetition. Chapter 3 asks
“what a maze can mean” to a rat who experi-
ences it, and how it is that rats recognize and
navigate different parts of it. The fourth
chapter looks at the perception that animals
have of human expectations and how this can
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be a major factor in results, as the animals ask
themselves “what does it (the human) want of
me?” Chapter 5 investigates the idea of
response and says “the question of response is
a question whose answer changes everything.”
The ﬁnal chapter says that “joy is demanding”
and takes account of how recent research in
judgment and emotions opens a fertile ﬁeld
for considering how animals judge the ques-
tions of research and what they feel about the
activities and situations involved. The inter-
view and discussion gives an elucidation of
some of the themes and concepts Despret intro-
duces in the book.
lures and artefacts
I n the mid-1960s experimental psychologyreceived severe critiques on the subject of
the validity of its experiments: experimental
subjects conform most often to the expectations
of their experimenters. This is to say, as the
American psychologists Martin Orne and
Robert Rosenthal will each argue in their own
way, that every experiment relies in large part
on an artefact: the scientists think that the sub-
jects respond to the question that is posed to
them, but the subjects, in fact, respond to
another question.
If I propose to take an interest in this and to
make this detour it is because these critiques
touch very close to the subject that I would
like to explore. They interrogate the way in
which the subjects of the experiments and
their responses are affected by the way in
which they live and actively take into account
that which is expected of them. In sum, we
will see, these two critiques pose the problem
of the “point of view” of those whom the
science investigates, the “point of view” on
the question that is addressed to them, or on
the protocol to which they are submitted, and
how they respond to what they interpreted the
question of the experimenter to be. Now, it is
exactly this that seems to constitute, even if
later and in forms surpassing that of critique,
a remarkable slide in research on animals:
beginning to take into consideration the point
of view that animals have on the way in which
they can take a position in relation to what is
proposed to them in scientiﬁc research.
The critiques of Orne and Rosenthal emerged
at the same time, during the 1960s; both of them
emanate from the very interior of psychology
since they were both trained by practitioners
of experimentation. Their critiques are
founded on relatively close empirical premises
and are presented in a very similar form:
many of the convergences will nonetheless para-
doxically lead to very different, even antagon-
istic, responses and propositions.
We should specify that their critique was not,
in and of itself, an absolute novelty. Psycholo-
gists were well aware that their subjects could
be inﬂuenced by what the scientist was looking
for. This was incidentally the reason why, in
the research, the experimenters tried most
often to camouﬂage the real questions guiding
their research, which would permit them to era-
dicate the hypothesis according to which the
subjects would do what was demanded of them
because the researchers asked them to do so.
From the fact that they do not know what is
expected of them, because it is hidden from
them, the subjects do not do what they do
because the experimenter asked them to do so,
but for more abstract and more general
reasons. This, according to the psychologists,
would therefore guarantee the “ecological val-
idity” of the experiment. This describes or
demonstrates something that would apply
outside the laboratory, which would not be the
case if the subjects had done what they did
because the scientist had asked them to do so:
that which they did by means of this strategy,
they would do in other circumstances.
When the psychologist Stanley Milgram, to
take up a famous experiment dating from the
same period, undertakes to study the capacity
for obedience in humans, he does not ask his
subjects: “are you capable of electrocuting
someone because I ask you to do it?” He pre-
tends, on the contrary, that they are taking
part in an experiment on the effects of punish-
ment in the learning setting, and that they
must give electric shocks to a “student” when
he does not respond correctly to questions that
they must pose to him (the experimenter


























convinces them that he is also a volunteer in the
experiment). Since the subjects do not know
that they are taking part in research on obedi-
ence, Milgram feels well justiﬁed in claiming
that the true stakes of the experiment will not
guide their responses. The problem of expec-
tations, it was thought, had found its solution.
Orne and Rosenthal will, however, take up,
each in his own way, this critique of the inﬂu-
ence of the experimenter and take it further.
On the one hand, this matter of the effect of
the question was until then conﬁned almost
exclusively to experiments with humans, since
it was believed that they were the only ones sen-
sitive to expectations.1 Rosenthal extends it to
animals: they too would be affected by what is
expected of them by the experimenters, and
this would modify their performances.2 On the
other hand, if human psychology had thought
to ﬁnd a solution to this problem of expectations
in hiding from its subject the real stakes of each
experiment (as I just indicated in the case of
Milgram), Orne shows that this solution raises
still more difﬁculties than it resolves. The sub-
jects, most of the time, not only predict what
the experimenter expects of them but they
conform to it with such good will that the care
taken to hide these expectations cannot but
underscore their extreme importance (Orne;
Orne and Holland).
Starting with the work of Orne, we’ll
approach that of Rosenthal in the next
chapter.3 In the beginning, this experimental
psychologist, a specialist in hypnosis, did not
have a critical dismantling of the way in which
experiments were conducted in mind; he
simply wanted to ﬁnd the experimental disposi-
tive that would allow him to discover a reliable
marker of difference between the subjects who
had been hypnotized and those who had not.4
In fact, nothing up to that point in the exper-
imental procedure guaranteed that one was
dealing with a subject really under hypnosis,
and not with a subject that was simulating it.
Every procedure indicating hypnosis was conse-
quently always suspect, since one could never
prove that the phenomenon the effects of
which one was trying to elucidate was indeed
what one claimed to have set up. Orne therefore
considers a situation that can “make a differ-
ence”: according to him, the capacity to tolerate
an annoying task and to do it well over a long
period of time and simply because the exper-
imenter had asked for it would clearly create
the contrast. Hypnotized people should, in prin-
ciple, show a very different deference from that
of normal subjects.
Orne starts with the test group, composed of
non-hypnotized subjects. He asks them to
conduct an absolutely absurd, repetitive, and
tedious task. This was to resolve some two
hundred additions on a sheet of paper and, at
the end of this, to ﬁsh for a card that would
invariably give a directive to tear the completed
paper into thirty-two pieces, then to take
another calculation paper, resolve the two
hundred additions there, take another card
that would invariably have a directive to… It
would be the experimenter who, after more
than ﬁve hours of observation, blinked ﬁrst.
And when the subjects were asked why they
did all this work without objecting and
without posing other questions, they responded
that they had thought that it was a test of endur-
ance. And they obeyed because a scientist asked
them to. That is to say that they did not respond
to the question that the scientist thought he was
asking but to the way in which they interpreted
that which was expected of them, in the very
particular context of the laboratory.
Now, Orne remarks, if I had asked my sec-
retary to do a fortieth of this task, she would
have refused. He continues, if you ask some
people in your entourage whether they agree
to do you a favor, and on their afﬁrmative
response you tell them to do ﬁve push-ups,
they will respond “why?” If you ask a group of
people if they want to take part in a scientiﬁc
experiment and, after their agreement, you tell
them that you expect them to do ﬁve push-
ups, they will ask “where?” Deference, Orne
concludes, evidently cannot constitute the
acceptable criterion of difference between hyp-
notized subjects and “normal” experimental
subjects.5
In light of what his subjects responded to
him, Orne goes further in concluding that the



























psychology, far from resolving the problem,
only complicates it. A simple dispositive sufﬁces
to show this: Orne brings the subjects together
and tells them what will be asked of them and
what they will have to do in the course of the
experiment. He carefully describes the protocol
and the tasks to execute without telling them
more about it than if they were really participat-
ing in the experiment, therefore hiding, as is
done in these types of situations, the real
stakes. He asks them at the beginning of
these explanations what, in their view, the psy-
chologist is really looking for: the subjects
then formulate very precise and pertinent
hypotheses.
This has since been nicely shown by an inves-
tigation of that famous experiment of Milgram’s
that I referenced above. The scientiﬁc journalist
Ian Parker went to re-interview the subjects who
had taken part in the experiment, forty years
later. Most of them told him that, if they had
played the game, it was precisely because they
had understood that the experiment must
necessarily have been rigged, since it is clear,
according to them, that electrocuting people is
not allowed in universities. Certainly, one can
always suspect that persons retroactively
revisit the story and seek to give themselves a
clear conscience by always pretending to have
known that it was, as the children say, “only
make believe.” The fact remains that the argu-
ments make good sense: it would be difﬁcult
to imagine sending – with the blessing of a scien-
tist, and under his responsibility – lethal
charges to another human in a respected univer-
sity – to an animal, we should note, it would be a
different matter. The people interviewed, on the
other hand, proposed explanations that seem
convincing to me: some said, for example, that
at the moment when the supposed victim
screamed in pain they turned worried toward
the desk of Milgram and his assistant watching
the operations, behind glass, and saw them
laughing – or undisturbed. They concluded
from this what they should conclude. When
Ian Parker asked them why they then contin-
ued, and why they said nothing, since they
had taken account of the fact that all of this
was nothing but a farce, they responded that it
was “for the sake of science.”6 Since they were
asked to…
The allure of a paradox in this type of
research should not be ignored. When psychol-
ogy inquires into this problematic deference on
the part of the subjects, what it covers over or
deliberately ignores is that this deference is
not an inherent characteristic of humans, it is
due to the organization of the research itself.
Everything points to the necessity of this: the
rigid and constraining protocol, the fact that
the scientist distributes expertise in a very
asymmetrical manner, a situation close to that
of the examination, the supposed or induced
ignorance of the subjects, etc. Now, psychology
treats deference not as an effect of what it
imposes but as an essential characteristic that
it acts to counter. Which leads to a paradox: psy-
chologists construct dispositives that give rise to
deference and must do everything possible to
neutralize it. And, as in every situation with a
lure, they are then obliged to keep asking:
“but did my subjects really believe me? Did
they not nonetheless understand what I was
looking for and respond to that very question,
without my knowledge?” They also use post-
test questionnaires to verify that the subjects
have indeed been taken for a ride. Now, and it
is Orne who emphasizes this, the subjects, in
this case, knowing that the fact of having under-
stood the hypothesis will invalidate their
research, prefer to say nothing and to continue
pretending to have responded in all naivety –
it is what is called the pact of double ignorance,
since neither of the two, neither the exper-
imenter, nor the subject, really has the desire
to say or to know what is really at play: on
either side, this would ruin the experiment. It
would thus be much better, concludes Orne,
in the experiments, to count on the collabor-
ation of the subjects rather than on their so-
called gullibility.
what a maze can mean
In proposing to translate what happens to rats in
terms of meanings, I draw here on the very
important work of the naturalist Jakob von
Uexküll, and his theory, especially that of the


























Umwelt. And since we are with the rats here, it
is with them that I propose to consider the ways
in which this theory could open up for the
animal, at least partially, the question of point
of view.
Some biographical elements are in order.
Jakob von Uexküll was an Estonian naturalist
(1864–1944). After studies in biology, he took
part in a comparative study of invertebrate
physiology. This research led him, contrary to
what the practices of the time encouraged
doing, to want to enlarge his perspective and
to consider the totality of the organism in
relation to its environment (milieu), an environ-
ment that he will deﬁne as a concrete or lived
one: the Umwelt.
The intuition from which this theory departs
is to all appearances quite simple: the animal,
endowed with sensory organs different from
our own, cannot perceive the same world as we
do. Bees don’t have the same perception of
color as we do, we do not perceive scents in
the same way that butterﬂies do, and we are
not at all able to sense, as a tick can, the odor
of the butyric acid released by the sebaceous fol-
licles of mammals. It is there that the theory will
take a courageously original turn, for perception
will be deﬁned not as a form of “reception” but
as an act of creation: the animal does not per-
ceive passively, it “ﬁlls its environment with
perceptual objects,” it constructs its environ-
ment by peopling it with perceptual objects
that, from then on, become perceived. In
other words, perceptions are not passive, they
are the object of an activity by which the
animal will perceive them. The activity of per-
ception is above all an activity that confers
meaning. Only that which has a meaning is per-
ceived, just as only that which can be perceived,
and which is important for the organism, is
accorded a meaning.
The Umwelt, or lived world of the animal, is
above all a world where things are only per-
ceived, on the one hand, because they are cap-
tured by particular sensory equipment – the
butterﬂy lives in a world of luminous intensities
and of odors, for example – and, on the other
hand, to the degree in which they have taken
on a meaning. And it is with these meanings
that the animal constructs its perceptual uni-
verse. Time, space, place, path, way, house,
odor, enemy, each event in the perceived
world is an event that “signiﬁes,” which is not
perceived except in that it signiﬁes – and by
that which it signiﬁes – an event that makes of
the animal a “lender” of meaning, that is to
say a subject. For each perception of meaning,
according to Uexküll, implies a subject, just as
each subject is deﬁned as that which accords
meaning. How do things acquire a meaning?
Quite simply, Uexküll responds, through
action. The animal never enters into a relation
with an object as such. The object is constituted
in action; its meaning does not emerge except in
relation to action that can be practiced.
Objects are not alone in having meanings
accorded to them. Inspiring the work of
Konrad Lorenz, in fact, Uexküll will hold that
the Umwelt is at the same time an environment
of relations, that is to say an environment in
which beings will take on various meanings for
one another. Consequently, if it is perceived,
no animal can be neutral in the environment
of another; that is to say if it can be accorded
a meaning, or if it can be seen to be accorded
one. What does a jackdaw mean in the life of a
jackdaw, or rather, what does this jackdaw
mean in the life of this other jackdaw? This is
the question that Lorenz will pose to Tchock,
the jackdaw he adopted. It is a strange lure
that made this type of research possible:
Lorenz himself became the alluring producer
of sociality, an enticement for meanings (since
lures are frequently required in order to
convey the meanings of an animal). By adopting
a young jackdaw, Lorenz shows that a human
can take on the meaning of “socius” and sub-
sequently learn what “socius” means in the life
of a jackdaw. The jackdaws who live in society
have the habit of associating, for their whole
lives, with a companion (socius) with whom
they carry out various activities together.
Tchock, who was raised by Lorenz, thus took
him for a maternal socius. He followed him
everywhere and asked him to give him food.
He later tried to teach him to ﬂy; but after the
failure of his repeated attempts the jackdaw



























activity companion, acceptable, certainly, but
limited. This original adventure shows us that
meanings are not ﬁxed once and for all,
ﬂowing from elementary needs of the organism:
they are ﬂexible, can apply to other beings,
extend to unforeseen situations, change, and
even invent and create new relational uses.
It is time now to return to the rats, with the
goal of asking them, in accordance with a tra-
dition that I am, however, interrogating, to
help me to test a hypothesis: when observing
rats, what can produce the activity of translating
their behaviors in terms of meanings?
“Thousands of experimental series have been
made in the past decades by numerous Ameri-
can scientists,” Uexküll writes, “who tried to
determine how soon an animal was able to
learn a certain pathway, through requiring
widely varied animals to orient themselves in a
maze… They have neither investigated the
visual, tactile or scent cues, nor given thought
to the application of the coordinate system by
the animal – that right and left is a problem in
itself has never struck them. Nor have they
ever debated the question of the number of
paces, because they did not see that in
animals, too, the pace may serve as the
measure of distance” (“Stroll” 51).
The critique is certainly merited, but its accu-
racy requires some clariﬁcation. The behavior-
ists, and John Watson in particular, did in fact
very much consider the inﬂuence of optical,
tactile, and olfactory perceptual characteristics.
I would not, however, go so far as to say that
they examined them. Unless one confuses the
term “examine” with that of “neutralize.” For
that is indeed what Watson did, in a procedure
that, if one were to think of it as resembling an
examination, would guide the patient toward a
sadistic torturer rather than to their doctor: he
removed the rat’s eyes, olfactory bulb, and whis-
kers, which are essential to the sense of touch in
rats, before throwing it into the exploration of
the maze. And since the rat no longer wished
to run in the maze or go in search of the food
payment, he starved him: “he began at once to
learn the maze and ﬁnally became the usual
automaton.”7 Of course. All that he proves is
that, if we remove the conscience from a
psychologist, he continues to write.8 Who has
become the automaton in this story?
This falls far short. And it is certainly very far
from the universe of meanings. For that matter,
this is even further from it since the being
issuing from this systematic practice of destruc-
tion is no longer, for the psychologist, a rat. If
the world had probably lost all meaning for
this de-sensed rat, the rat itself had lost all
meaning for its experimenter – that is, if it
ever had one for him. It is a new organism,
reduced to a minimum of its sensations, and
who, from this fact, counts for all the others.
This is the goal of the procedure: search out
the lowest common denominator, the “left-
over,” the automaton, the behavior that, from
one species to another, will render all organisms
commensurable (Burt). And this commensur-
ability, it can be underlined in passing, bears
on the criterion par excellence for a society
haunted by the idea of production and efﬁciency
(Haraway 43ff.): the time required to run a
maze.
All of this, one can see, has nothing to do with
the meanings that the maze can take on for the
rat. We haven’t learned much of value; it is on
this point that Uexküll will resume his critique,
in his essay on the theory of meaning: “In this
way, American researchers have attempted tire-
lessly, in thousands of experiments, beginning
with white rats, to study the most different
kinds of animals in their relations to a maze.
The unsatisfying results of these labors, which
were conducted with the most precise methods
of measurement and the greatest skill in calcu-
lation, could have been predicted by anybody
who had come to the realization that the tacit
assumption that an animal could ever enter
into a relationship with an object is false”
(Uexküll, Foray 139; Despret cites Uexküll,
Mondes animaux 94).
One can note in passing that this critique
ﬁnds an echo today in the research on well-
being. When we ask chickens about their prefer-
ences, Robert Dantzer explains, we generally
ask them what effort they are ready to agree to
for a particular environment. The bird has use
of two keys that it can work with its beak to
narrow (with one key) or augment (with the


























other) the size of the cage. One can note, he con-
tinues, not without a point of irony, that the
space the chickens grant themselves differs
little from commercial conditions. One could
conclude from this therefore that it is the
optimum space for chickens. “But this would
be a bit hasty and neglect a major epistemologi-
cal problem, namely that it is not straightfor-
ward to enter into the subjective universe of
an animal in interrogating it through an exper-
imental dispositive thought up by a human. It
is possible that the animal responds in the
experimental dispositive on the basis of very
different elements, for example the proximity
of a congener, but not the representation of
the space in itself as such” (Dantzer 99).9
To return to the rat: on the basis of what
elements does it respond when it is submitted
to the demand to traverse the maze? Posing
this question goes back to asking what this par-
ticular experimental dispositive can mean for a
rat. How can this traversing come to be, from
the point of view of the rat, that which
Uexküll calls a “familiar path”? How do the
rats, in pretending to respond to the questions
of the behaviorists (in this case, the question
is: what is the abstract relation of a being, what-
ever it may be, that which the behaviorists call
an organism, to a neutral object?), respond in
fact to another question? For it is indeed this
that it concerns: the artefact par excellence.
The rats respond to another question than the
one the experimenter poses to them. And the
experimenter can never suspect this would be
the case, simply because he never took into con-
sideration the point of view that the rat could
have of the situation.
The problem can be posed differently, on the
basis of another supposition, that will allow us
to afﬁrm Uexküll’s hypothesis by adding some
clariﬁcations to it: why do rats always touch
the walls as they go along them? It is this that
all those who have been able to observe rats,
notably when they invade our houses, have
been able to afﬁrm. Responding to this question
will give us some indices as to what a “familiar
path” can be for a rat. We must, however, refor-
mulate the question, exiting the why of causes
and entering into the regime of meanings:
from this perspective, what does a wall (some-
thing to run along) mean for a rat? The Ameri-
can biologists who observed them invented a
term to characterize rats: they are “hapto-
philes,” they like to touch. The wall therefore
has the meaning of “thing to touch.” But a
slightly more complicated hypothesis could
make sense of this characteristic (Sullivan 12).
Rats developed a particular kinesthetic
memory, since the rat must resolve this
problem in its everyday activities. And its hap-
tophilia is a response to this problem. In its
daily peregrinations that lead it from the nest
to different places of exploration that will
permit it to feed itself, how can it ﬁnd the
return path? How to memorize the indications,
and all the more so since the majority of these
are indications that have meaning only for
humans – objects, name and number of the
street, right, left, or indeed even maps or
designs? The rat resolved this problem by
mapping its route in another manner. It
inscribes the course of its route in its body in
the form of lines, curves, and turns, or even
roughnesses, textures, sensations of cold or
humidity – what do we know about what the
body of a rat can sense?
The rat draws, marks, soaks up, in its
muscles and on its skin, the map of a lateral
landscape. And it is the agreement of this map
with the sensations that it will check on the
return route that will tell it that it is indeed
going the right way, and that the nest will be
there, at the precise place where all the sen-
sations will have ﬁnished unfolding. The
relation to the trace is inverted: it is no longer
only a matter of “marking” the places one
passes, like rats and many animals do, extending
their bodies to the limits of their territory with
many doses of odiferous substance, it is also a
matter of letting itself be marked by the space,
itself organized by the trajectory, and of incor-
porating the organization.
All this is to say: the maze was built by
actively integrating a characteristic of the rat;
one could say it is “rattish,” in slightly mimick-
ing Uexküll. But it integrated this characteristic
by retranslating it as an abstract characteristic –



























considerable number of animals, inasmuch as it
is the object on which is built an inﬁnite series of
comparisons between what will become organ-
isms. Doing this, by effacing the link, the singu-
lar accord that can be woven between the rat and
the structure that is presented to it, by render-
ing unthinkable the event of what a maze
could constitute for the rat, the experimental
dispositive pulls the rug out from any question-
ing on the subject of the rat, on all that which it
could bear witness to regarding what is interest-
ing for it. Since the rat does not respond to the
question of learning, he responds to the ques-
tion of an architecture that constitutes the
world for him. Which is altogether different.
And which cannot, from the manner in which
the things are organized, be predicted.
Of course, we are here in the territory of
meaning and points of view. I remain,
however, with my question: how does the rat
interpret this particular dimension of the exper-
iment that sets her within a question from a
human, how does she translate what is expected
of her? How does she interpret what is wanted of
her, when she is made to run, when she is
rewarded, or when she is blinded and each of
her sense organs is removed before she is
starved? To this question, which is perhaps a
contemporary question, at least in the domain
of the sciences, Uexküll makes no response.
These are the limits of his ﬁeld of inquiry. For
if Uexküll can attribute a subjectivity to the
animal, and if the Umwelt is also a social
environment, it seems to me that his interest
is particularly focused on the physical environ-
ment and its objects. The “animal’s own
world” can, with difﬁculty, include the human
observer as an observer. The “own world”
does not appear as a world subject to the
double hybridization that requires the inter-
speciﬁc encounter and the crossing of an exper-
imental universe with that of an experience of
life. In other words still, even if the “own
world” of Uexküll can aspire to “thinking as”
another animal, only with difﬁculty can it envi-
sage a “thinking with” this other animal.10
Besides, the animals that Uexküll, as a biol-
ogist, focused on (ticks, ﬂies, sea urchins), are
relatively simple organisms, of whom it could
not be said, to put it somewhat simply, that it
is easy to interest them in our problems.
The fact remains that the contrast set up
regarding the ways of thinking what a maze
can represent maintains its full pertinence,
and gives a measure of the cost, in terms of
knowledge, of failing to take the animal’s
point of view into account. The maze can auth-
orize neither the question of the “familiar
path” nor that of the meaning of the wall, still
less its meaning as event in the world of a rat.
It forbids doing so all the more surely since it
is constructed in such a way that this question
cannot be opened, since the rat cannot do
other than follow along the walls. And when
an animal cannot do other than what he is con-
strained to do, when he does so only because
he does not have other possibilities or other
choices, then there is a certitude: this has to
do with an artefact. At the very least with one
artefact.
what does it expect of me?
I closed the preceding section in a somewhat
elliptical manner, by afﬁrming that the situation
in the maze presents at least one artefact, leaving
one to think that there would then be others.
One will recall that, regarding the experiments
of human psychology, I deﬁned as artefactual
the situations where the being who is interro-
gated responds to a different question than the
one the scientist poses to her. But there are
many ways of responding to another question:
there are therefore as many possibilities of
artefacts.
If I broached this problem at the beginning of
the book it is for a simple reason: when the ques-
tion of the artefact is posed – I learned in the
course of this research – there is frequently
something interesting that opens up as possible.
It appeared to me that, most of the time, the
hypothesis of the existence of an artefact accom-
panies the possibility of taking into account the
fact that the animal would have a point of view
on the situation. Certainly, this possibility can
be ignored, can lead to, as Rosenthal pointed
out, the will to a larger epistemological sanitiza-
tion, where the researcher does not take full


























measure of what his anxiety prompts in the
course of research. When this anxiety, in lieu
of expanding the imagination, paralyzes it. I
also equally learned to recognize, under the
form of the injunction of “more control,” the
little red light that announces this paralysis.
And I admit to being a bit sad each time that
a good opportunity was missed: what I
thought to be a promise will not be kept. For
there is something promissory each time the
anxiety of the artefact is proﬁled in the sciences
that mobilize the beings that respond to it. Con-
sider, then, how the promises weaken and what
favors the fact that they can receive, as a
response, that which they take on.
In an article evaluating the research on
relations between humans and livestock
animals, the authors note that the animals can
react to the observers. However, they continue,
these are not the only elements taken into
account by the animal: “Researchers must also
consider the animals’ expectations during a
test. For example, choice tests measuring
animals’ preferences for or aversion to different
handling procedures indicated that they could
predict which procedure was likely […] from
environmental or human cues.”11 That is to
say, and I follow here the authors’ conclusion,
that generalization becomes problematic. Each
experiment indicates not only the manner in
which the animals generally experience the pro-
cedures but the way in which each of the animals
lives them as a function of the perception that it
has of them, as a function of what it expects.
One can see that the problem of expectations
is here attributed to the subject of the exper-
iment and that it conveys the way in which the
animal actively integrates what is expected of
it. Certainly, generalization is in that case
compromised.
In fact I will go further in afﬁrming that there
is no artefact unless there is generalization. If
one knows to what speciﬁc question this
animal here, with perceptible or deducible
expectations, in this particular context,
responds, then there is no artefact. This
clearly does not resolve the problem of general-
ization.12 That which, one senses, can just as
well open either onto a need for more control
(even if somewhat vain), in virtue of which the
researchers get it into their heads to neutralize
everything that could permit the animal to inter-
pret what is expected of it; or, in a more fecund
manner, onto the fact of becoming interested in
how the animal interprets the situation. In the
ﬁrst case, one does not eradicate the artefact –
since animals always expect something, there-
fore always respond to another question; in the
second, we subordinate the results to the ques-
tion: “To what did it respond?”
The way in which the expectations of the
animal affect the experiments was well noted
by some animal professionals, and some scien-
tists, in research designed to evaluate certain
foods for farm animals.13 It would seem, when
we observe the ways they behave, that animals
interpret these dispositives for what they are:
exceptional dispositives. But for some of them
the term “exceptional” would seem to take on
a double meaning: “this is not usual” and
“this will not last.” Things become more com-
plicated. In fact, everything about them indi-
cates exceptionality: the time of the
experimental dispositive is not the same since
it is set within a provisional and short time
(ﬁve days of testing, corresponding to the
work week) while the time of the farm is a
time of accumulated memories and experiences.
That which is given to the animal as food also
falls under the exceptional, since new types of
feed will be tested.
Now, if animals eat these types of fodder with
less appetite, it is for a very simple reason:
because it is not the same thing that they are
used to receiving. “From the point of view of
the animal, the memory of the food eaten
before plays a role, and thus it eats less than
in usual circumstances: the results, then, say
nothing about the situation but instead about
the manner in which the animal interprets the
transition. It expects something else, thus
what one gives it is not the sole cause involved.
This has to do with the effects of the transition
because the animals, and it is the animal experts
like farmers and shepherds who tell us this,
know that this situation will not last. In the
same way, when one tries a new dry fodder



























group next to them receives fresh grass, they
stop eating and think: ‘we too are going to
have some of that’. And thus the results of the
experiment are dependent on what takes place
in the experiment next to it, but no one takes
account of the fact that the researches are com-
partmentalized.”14 One could not give a better
deﬁnition of the artefact: animals certainly
respond to a question, but it is not the one we
pose to them. The humor of the situation is
too nice not to be underlined: the researchers
compartmentalize the research; the animals do
not stop prompting them to decompartmenta-
lize it.15
At this point in my exposition you could
respond to me that all these critiques go
against my hypothesis, that things haven’t
really changed since what they are directed at
is the fact that researchers do not take into
account the point of view of the animal. I am
going to try to respond.
First of all, I approached the problem from
the point of view of the artefact. I recall here
that it was in this manner that it was possible
to get bearings on the moments when the
researchers pose the question from the point
of view that the animal can have on the exper-
imental situation. Now, the artefact always con-
stitutes the object of a critique: a critical worry
when the researcher ponders her own work; an
accusation when another researcher says of the
work of a colleague: “you didn’t think of” or,
to take back up the terms that Dantzer used,
regarding the cages and the chickens, “you
have been a bit hasty.” In a certain manner,
when Waiblinger afﬁrms that the animal can
predict what will be offered to it, or when
Meuret suggests that that animals think “we
are also going to have some of that,” we are
very much within this perspective: animals do
not judge an abstract situation, but a situation
offered to them as it is offered to them.
Following this, I can conﬁrm that some
researchers have crossed the divide that consists
in taking into consideration the animals’ points
of view on the situations presented to them –
but not all researchers. And the critiques are
evidence of those, and for those, who have
crossed the divide.
Finally, the critique can just as much take the
form of anxiety. In this frame, it would mean
that the researchers actively and explicitly
started to take into account the fact that the
animal poses, to her researcher, the question:
what do they want of me? When, for example,
Meuret describes his own research, his approach
seems to me particularly exemplary of this
possibility of considering, actively, the manner
in which the animal itself actively takes the
questions and the presence of the researcher
into consideration. Meuret observes sheep and
goats and a part of his research consists in eval-
uating what they eat when we put them in unfa-
miliar situations such as zones of underbrush
clearing (to avoid forest ﬁres). After a ﬁrst
stage of reciprocal habituation between the
animals observed and their observers, each
researcher on the team follows, each day, an
animal and observes what they eat all day.
Each detail is carefully noted, each species of
plant inventoried, each bite recorded. The
proximity is complete, the interest for the
observed is unﬂagging.
The scientiﬁc method requires that the
animals be chosen randomly, in order to consti-
tute a random sample. But this random choice
can turn out to be disastrous, for many
reasons. The procedure therefore requires
going through a series of steps. As such, the
second step is designed “to identify animals
within the group that can be monitored uninter-
ruptedly from a very close distance. While alter-
nating movement within the group and close
monitoring, the observers look for individuals
which seem indifferent to their permanent pres-
ence. The full-time presence of an observer
automatically changes the social status of an
individual. This is why, at the beginning of
this step, the individuals to be sought should
neither be a leader nor an aspirant leader.
Here again, it is important to listen to the
herder’s advice if he knows well the social hier-
archy within his ﬂock. At the end of this step,
about 15–20% of the individuals are considered
to meet the prerequisites for full-time close
monitoring” (Agreil and Meuret 101–02). In
this manner, for certain goats, Meuret explains,
the fact of being the object of an intense interest


























on the part of the human gives rise among them
to forms of conduct such as that of wanting to
supplant the others, to take their food, even of
seeking ﬁghts. For others, being the object of
a researcher’s attention will provoke the aggres-
sion of their companions, as if the observer’s
interest conveyed a desire on the part of the
goat to change its place in the hierarchy. And
this introduces a famous disorder into the
group. On the other hand, Meuret continues,
we no longer really know what we are seeing:
what a goat eats in natural conditions, or on
the contrary, what a goat eats when it wants to
show to others its superiority since, suddenly,
it thinks that its status has changed.
Of course, one could always translate the pre-
ceding into the shoddiest and most conventional
version of the artefact: we inﬂuence that which
we observe! But if this version seems shoddy
to me, and if I oppose this somewhat lazy con-
clusion with which the systematic theories
have pestered our ears, it is only because it
reduces the problem to its simplest expression.
Because it supposes, once again, that there
would be an active, inﬂuencing observer, and a
passive observed, whose sole activity would be
to be inﬂuenced. Now, there are many signs
that say otherwise, that say that this has to do
with beings who negotiate the conditions of
research, who mutually affect one another,
who exchange judgments and opinions, who
reciprocally modify one another and who know
that they do it.
Michel Meuret does not speculate on the fact
that he inﬂuences the goats or the sheep that he
observes, he actively asks them to take a pos-
ition in relation to his proposals and he is in
harmony with theirs.16 He expects, and he
expects of the sheep and goats, that they
respond to him, contest, and protest. And this
implies something other than a simple reﬂexiv-
ity on the question of inﬂuence: it demands
attention.17 The concern could be exclusively
epistemological, and in fact it is epistemologi-
cal, but not exclusively. Yes, it is a matter of
not disturbing, of not creating an artefact, but
there is also a quality of the relation, a
concern for the comfort of the animal, a right-
ness of the relations that transpire as much in
the writings as in what he relates to me.
Meuret explains, for example, that at the third
step (we had remained a bit with the second)
the candidates observed are abandoned if their
attitude testiﬁes to “the interest, the anxiety of
a discomfort due to the close and constant pres-
ence of the observer.”18 Why is interest a bad
motive, in this frame? Because the animal
must be interested in other things besides the
human being, it must continue to live its life
as a goat or a sheep. The choice of the “good”
animal is founded on a very simple conviction:
the animal responds to her observer; and it is
what her response indicates that will constitute
the criteria permitting the continuation, or not,
of the observation. A last remark from a
researcher illustrates this in an even clearer
manner: “… a good sign to start an observation
is when an animal pushes you because you are in
the way of what it covets: this says that it is
capable of demonstrating that you are bothering
it.”19 You want to practice
habituation and be certain not
to disturb the animals? The sol-
ution, as simple as it is, took
time to emerge: all you have to
do is ask them.
disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by
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notes
Translated from Vinciane Despret, Penser
comme un rat © Editions Quae, Versailles, 2009,
8–15, 28–45.
1 Certainly, the investigation conducted in Berlin
in 1904 about the case of the famous clever
Hans, the horse who knew how to count, could
be considered as the start of the critical elucidation
of the effect of human expectations on an animal.
However, the point of focus of the research,
oriented toward the human factor and heavily
laden with the mechanism typical of the emerging
behaviorism, minimized the point of view that the
horse could have on the situation. To put it in



























in the perspective adopted, did not “respond” to
the expectations but “reacted” to them. On this
subject see Despret, Hans.
2 One finds an account of his research in
Rosenthal, Experimenter Effects.
3 The analysis of Rosenthal’s research is contained
in the following chapter of Despret’s book, but is
not included in this excerpt. [Translator’s note.]
4 The French term dispositif has an important
specificity that has caused difficulties in prior trans-
lation and in capturing the range of meanings that it
covers (including technical, military, legal, and
ontological/arrangement dimensions). The term is
at once an everyday, general term for referring
to machines and devices of all kinds (such as
cameras and pencil sharpeners but also airplanes)
and it is a philosophical concept that has been
drawn upon by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault,
Louis Althusser, Giorgio Agamben and many
others. Owing to the technical connotations of
the term, it has often been rendered as “apparatus”
in English, but this presents a major problem since
the French term appareil, much more closely
related to “apparatus,” is used as distinct from dis-
positif by the thinkers mentioned. Owing to the
specificity of the concepts, there is an increasing
use of the English term “dispositive” to capture dis-
positif and the distinctions from appareil. Timothy
Armstrong’s earlier translation of Deleuze’s
famous essay on Foucault’s use of the concept
uses “social apparatus” to distinguish it from
“apparatus” and to emphasize the social and assem-
bling dimensions. These social and assembling
dimensions are particularly important to Despret’s
use of the concept in the philosophy of science and
ethology. See Gilles Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce qu’un dis-
positif?” in Michel Foucault philosophe (Paris: Seuil,
1989), Giorgio Agamben, Che cos’è un dispositivo?
(Rome: Nottetempo, 2006), and Jeffrey Bussolini,
“What is a Dispositive?,” Foucault Studies 10
(2010): 85–107. [Translator’s note.]
5 Since then, the possibility of discriminating
between subjects really under hypnosis and sub-
jects simulating it has been able to be staged exper-
imentally. Thus, for example, a hypnotized subject
can be convinced that he no longer knows how to
read. “Not being able to read” seems impossible to
simulate: when we know how to read, in normal
conditions, the letters make sense in a fashion
that cannot be ignored; we can no longer “not
know how to read.” If one presents subjects with
an image representing the word “blue” written in
yellow, the non-hypnotized subjects will show a
latency time when one asks them the color of
the letters, the meaning “blue” interfering with
the answer “yellow”; the subjects under hypnosis,
for their part, do not demonstrate this latent delay.
6 Parker, “Obedience.” For an analysis of the
question of the authority of the scientist, and the
way in which subjects actively take account of
what is asked of them, to which the present text
remains, across the years, profoundly indebted, I
refer to Isabelle Stengers, Invention of Modern
Science.
7 Watson, “Kinaesthetic and Organic Sensations”
2–3; cited in the wonderful little book by the
English historian Jonathan Burt, Rat (103).
8 For a more extended analysis of what this type of
experiment does to the experimenter, see Vin-
ciane Despret, Quand le loup habitera avec l’agneau.
9 We find elsewhere, in an article by Isabelle Veis-
sier and Bjorn Forkman, a very clear critique on the
ties between different types of defining well-being
(and therefore of testing it experimentally) and
the different philosophical conceptions that
preside over each of these definitions.
10 I would like to thank my philosophy colleagues
at the University of Liège, and particularly Julien
Piéron and Stéphane Galetic, whose attentive
interest, commentaries, and discussions helped
me greatly in analyzing the work of von Uexküll.
11 I have referred to this article before in terms of
the illumination of the little red light (the models
should permit more control): I try here to con-
tinue along the lines of interest opened up.
Waiblinger 197 for what follows.
12 François Calatayud asks whether it really
makes sense to present “to different individuals
conditions that one imagines to be equivalent in
order to test a hypothesis regarding an average
individual.” The notion of meaning, he explains, is
incompatible with an average individual, and this
is the case, the author continues, even if one is
able to bring forward two beings who have “the
same usage of the world.” Text from the confer-
ence “From natural behavior to the discourse of
ethology: Reflections on the place of subjectivity
in ethology,” presented at the colloquium orga-
nized by Florence Burgat, Comment penser le com-
portement animal (How to Think Animal Behavior),


























EHESS, Paris, 21–22 Jan. 2008. Burgat, Comment
penser le comportement animal.
13 In this regard, see the work of Michel Meuret.
In addition, Meuret agreed to take part in a long
interview with me in June 2008 in which we
were able to raise many of the questions that
gave rise to this research.
14 In the same interview with Michel Meuret.
15 This humor of the situation appeared to me
most clearly in following the work of the consult-
ant clinicians already mentioned (Hellal). Far be it
for me to compare animals and humans, but the
institutional structures and the type of intelligence
that they can give rise to are important. These clin-
icians based their work on the fact that the teams
of social workers confronted with multiple cases
of distress, and who frequently work with the
same family, but in ignorance of what their col-
leagues are doing, must learn to follow the decom-
partmentalizations that the families who call them
present to them.
16 One recognizes, under this formulation in
terms of “propositions,” the mark of the work of
Bruno Latour, notably in The Politics of Nature.
17 The animal professionals of the Theix Center
emphasize that the term “attention” largely over-
flows the dimension of “well-being.” “Paying atten-
tion” is to take care of, but it is also “to mind,” that
is to say to pay attention to someone and not to
ignore possible disagreement. For example,
“paying attention, they say, is to put limits on
what one does but also on what the animal does
(‘a just environment’ they also say).” This
dimension of attention insists on the fact that all
research is intrinsically founded on collaboration,
whether or not one ignores it, but they do
not ignore it and say that they are not able to
forget it.
18 Meuret interview with Despret, 2008.
19 Meuret interview.
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